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ABSTRACT  
This study examines the effect of board composition on the likelihood of corporate failure in the 
UK. We consider both independent and non-independent (grey) non-executive directors (NEDs) to 
enhance our understanding of the impact of NEDs’ personal or economic ties with the firm and its 
management on firm performance. We find that firms with a larger proportion of grey directors on 
their boards are less likely to fail. Furthermore, the probability of corporate failure is lower both when 
firms have a higher proportion of grey directors relative to executive directors and when they have a 
higher proportion of grey directors relative to independent directors. Conversely, there is a positive 
relationship between the likelihood of corporate failure and the proportion of independent directors on 
corporate boards. The findings discussed in this study support the collaborative board model and the 
view that corporate governance reform efforts may have overemphasised the monitoring function of 
independent directors and underestimated the benefits of NEDs’ affiliations with the firm and its 
management. 
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1. Introduction 
A series of unexpected corporate failures has reignited and increased concerns regarding the 
effectiveness of board oversight. Since the Cadbury Report was published in 1992, governance 
reformers in the UK have continued to emphasise the importance of independent directors who 
enhance the monitoring function of boards (e.g., the UK Corporate Governance Code, 2012). The 
term “independent director” generally refers to non-executive directors (NEDs) who are free from 
personal or economic ties with the firm and its management.1 NEDs who have such ties are classified 
as non-independent NEDs and are also known as “grey” directors. Corporate governance reformers 
typically argue that the existence of affiliations between NEDs and the firm diminishes the 
effectiveness of NED monitoring because such affiliations may result in conflicts of interest with 
shareholders. Despite the widespread belief among regulators that a higher proportion of independent 
directors on a board is good for governance, little is known regarding whether the increased focus on 
board independence is able to prevent corporate failure in the current corporate governance 
framework. 
This study considers the effectiveness of independent and grey directors and investigates the 
association between board composition and the likelihood of corporate failure. Corporate governance 
theorists have diverse perspectives on the ties between NEDs and the firm. From the agency 
perspective, independent directors are central to the effective resolution of agency problems between 
managers and shareholders. Their independence from the firm places them in a good position to 
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engage in monitoring and enables them to exercise independent judgement in evaluating managerial 
performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In contrast, NEDs personally or economically tied to the firm 
and the firm’s management have less incentive to challenge top management, as they may have 
common interests with management, which could lead to conflicts of interest with shareholders and 
adverse organisational outcomes. According to this view, independent directors can improve firm 
performance by monitoring management on behalf of shareholders. 
Alternatively, the advocates of the collaborative board model argue that the agency perspective 
only provides a partial basis for understanding the impact of board composition on corporate strategy 
and performance (Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Westphal, 1999). They suggest that board composition 
should optimise collaborative working relationships among its members (Almazan & Suarez, 2003). 
Ties between NEDs and the firm’s management can enable mutual trust and effective communication, 
which may facilitate information flow and advisory interactions in the boardroom (Westphal, 1999). 
Additionally, as NEDs typically serve on a part-time basis, the presence of such ties may align the 
interests of the NEDs and the company and increase the NEDs’ incentives to offer advice and 
resources to maximise firm performance. According to this model, grey directors are more likely to be 
involved in strategic decision-making through their affiliations with the firm, which may lead to 
favourable organisational outcomes. However, grey directors have received little formal recognition in 
the literature. 
Previous studies have acknowledged that the board’s functions of advising, providing resources 
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and monitoring are essential to a firm’s survival (Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1992), but they have not 
devoted sufficient attention to how ties between NEDs and the firm influence board effectiveness and 
the performance of firms. As noted, independent and grey directors act in inherently different ways to 
fulfil those different board tasks. It is possible that independent directors could perform best in a 
monitoring role, while grey directors could play important advising and resource dependence roles 
(Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Westphal, 1999). Underrepresentation of either independent or grey 
directors on the board may affect the firm’s ability to survive. We therefore argue that current 
governance practice, which inherently favours stacking NED positions with independent directors 
rather than grey directors, is likely to compromise the advisory and/or resource dependence roles of a 
board and make firms more susceptible to failure. 
This study employs a matched-pairs research design using a sample of 234 companies comprising 
117 failed firms and 117 non-failed control firms. The findings indicate that firms with greater 
proportions of grey directors are less likely to fail, while there is a positive association between the 
proportion of independent directors and the likelihood of corporate failure. Furthermore, comparing 
the failed firms to the non-failed firms, the failed firms have lower percentages of grey directors 
relative both to executive and independent directors on their boards. Overall, the findings support the 
collaborative board model (Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Westphal, 1999) and echo recent concerns that 
overemphasis on the monitoring and control roles of independent directors undermines the 
contributions NEDs can make to the advising and resource dependence functions of the board (Adams 
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& Ferreira, 2007; Faleye, Hoitash, & Hoitash, 2011). 
This study seeks to contribute to the existing literature in three ways. First, this study contributes to 
the debate over how close ties between NEDs and a firm affect the firm’s value. We award equal 
consideration to the effectiveness of independent and grey directors. Although a large number of 
studies depart from the agency perspective to examine the effects of independent directors, existing 
studies remain largely silent regarding the roles and effectiveness of grey directors. This study extends 
the collaborative board model to address this gap. 
Second, this study addresses the lack of discussion in the existing literature on the link between 
corporate failure and the composition of the board of directors (Daily, McDougall, Covin, & Dalton, 
2002). Filatotchev, Toms and Wright (2006) conceptually argue that a firm requires different corporate 
governance functions at different stages of the corporate lifecycle. To continue to survive, a distressed 
firm requires a greater degree of the strategic and resource functions of corporate governance. 
However, the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on firm survival are under-researched. By 
focusing on the context of corporate failure, this study adds to our understanding of corporate 
governance at the final stage in the corporate lifecycle. 
Third, the results of this study have important public policy implications. UK governance codes 
were developed in response to a series of unexpected failures, and many other countries have 
subsequently introduced new rules and practices. The context of corporate failure in the UK therefore 
provides a unique ground to examine regulators’ concerns regarding the contributions of independent 
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and grey directors. While there has been a widespread increase in the independence of boards and 
NEDs in the UK over the previous two decades, little consensus has been reached as to how to 
prevent corporate failure under the current corporate governance framework. Evidence collected from 
this setting is particularly salient. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. In the following section, we outline the extant 
literature concerning the roles and effectiveness of independent and grey directors and develop our 
hypotheses. The sample selection procedure and research design are described in the third section. 
The results are then presented and discussed. The final section draws conclusions. 
2. Review of the literature and development of hypotheses 
The board of directors leads and directs a company’s affairs (Cadbury, 1992). It is responsible for 
formulating strategy, providing advice to top management, ensuring critical resources are available to 
the firm and evaluating managerial performance (The Higgs Report, 2003). The board is a collection 
of individuals who act in different roles to fulfil these various functions (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Board composition therefore critically influences the success of a firm. Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) 
argue that organisational failure may occur when the composition of a board is imbalanced or 
inadequate.  
A mixture of executive, independent and grey directors are nominated to ensure that a board can 
effectively administer its multiple tasks (Baysinger & Butler, 1985). Unlike executive directors, 
independent and grey directors are NEDs who do not play any day-to-day executive roles in the firm. 
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They are expected to contribute to the board through their wide range of skills, knowledge base or ties 
to external resources (Goodstein & Boeker, 1991; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1992; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978). However, independent and grey directors are quite different. The latter have 
significant personal or economic ties with the firm beyond being board members (Vicknair, Hickman, 
& Carnes, 1993). It is argued that the absence or presence of such ties affects NEDs’ capacities and 
incentives to perform their monitoring, advising and resource dependence functions (Adams, 2009; 
Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). Operationally, independent directors are viewed as valuable monitors, 
while grey directors are viewed as important advisors or resource providers (Baysinger & Butler, 
1985; Westphal, 1999). 
2.1 Independent directors and corporate failure 
The theoretical support for the importance of board monitoring is rooted in agency theory (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). According to this perspective, the primary function of a board is to reduce agency 
costs resulting from the separation of ownership from control by overseeing managerial decisions and 
activities. Independent directors are free from economic interests or personal links with the firm and 
are therefore better suited to performing the monitoring task because they are more likely to 
objectively evaluate and discipline top management (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Additionally, Fama 
(1980) argues that independent directors have an incentive to be effective monitors to maintain the 
value of their reputational capital in the external labour market. High-performing NEDs would gain 
opportunities to serve on other boards (Shivdasani, 1993). Consequently, independent directors are 
 8 
 
more likely to better exercise the board’s control function (Zahra & Pearce II, 1989). Most important, 
they are better positioned to challenge management and encourage strategic change when a firm faces 
a continuing decline in performance (Daily & Dalton, 1994a), and such challenges are particularly 
valuable when a firm needs to change to maintain its survival (Weisbach, 1988). 
Therefore, the most common response to recent corporate scandals and collapses appears to be a 
greater emphasis on board independence. Corporate governance reformers generally adopt an agency 
perspective and place substantial emphasis on the monitoring function of the board. The UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2012), for example, recommends that a board be primarily composed of 
independent directors to ensure their effectiveness in exercising independent judgment in managerial 
oversight. 
The academic literature has recently become more interested in the board’s role in setting strategy. 
It is argued that agency theory provides only a partial basis for developing propositions concerning 
the impact of board composition on corporate strategy and performance (Adams & Ferreira, 2007; 
Harris & Raviv, 2008; Raheja, 2005). Operationally, the amount and quality of information available 
to independent directors significantly affect their effectiveness. Some argue that independent directors 
serve on a part-time basis and typically serve as directors on multiple boards (Patton & Baker, 1987). 
Thus, they are less likely to allocate sufficient time to gaining a thorough understanding of each 
business, which may lead to independent directors relying on their general knowledge rather than 
firm-specific knowledge in reviewing managerial performance and rewarding managers (Baysinger & 
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Hoskisson, 1990). Such a lack of firm-specific knowledge on the part of independent directors may 
allow room for managers to formulate myopic strategies for maximising their personal wealth, which 
may ultimately affect firm performance. 
Furthermore, independent directors generally have limited contact with day-to-day executive 
affairs, making them largely dependent on their interactions with top management to access 
firm-specific information for decision-making (Fama & Jensen, 1983). However, independent 
directors are strict monitors, and top management are typically unwilling to share privileged 
information with them out of fear of their intense scrutiny (Adams & Ferreira, 2007). Adam (2009) 
provides survey evidence that confirms this view that independent directors receive less strategic 
information from management. This informational disadvantage reduces their influence in corporate 
decision control. 
Faleye et al. (2011) argue that increasing the allocation of monitoring duties to independent 
directors reduces the time and effort they spend on advising. The authors provide evidence that a firm 
with a monitoring-intensive board is less likely to invest in R&D. Adam (2009) also documents that 
directors who perceive their primary duty to be management oversight are less likely to become 
involved in strategic advising. Such evidence suggests that independent directors cannot contribute 
equally to both monitoring and advising functions. Because boards fulfil different functions, the 
increased use of one mechanism might not be positively related to firm performance. Excessive 
emphasis on the independent directors’ monitoring function would limit the resources of the board 
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that are available for other wealth creating activities. 
The existing empirical evidence provides mixed results regarding the effectiveness of independent 
directors. Some findings support the importance of independent directors in, for example, disciplining 
poorly performing CEOs (Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994), protecting shareholder wealth (Byrd & 
Hickman, 1992) and ensuring corporate reporting quality (Beasley, 1996; Chahine & Filatotchev, 
2011; Setia-Atmaja, Haman, & Tanewski, 2011). However, most studies find only a small, statistically 
insignificant link between independent directors and firm performance (e.g., Agrawal & Knoeber, 
1996; Bhagat & Black, 2002; Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998). 
Although the findings regarding the effectiveness of independent directors on a board have been 
inconsistent, corporate governance reformers generally posit that weakness in board oversight appears 
to be an important determinant of corporate failure (e.g., Cadbury, 1992). Because independent 
directors are better equipped to monitor management, we predict that the positive aspects of 
independent directors are likely to outweigh the potential negative effects for problematic firms. We 
therefore predict the following: 
Hypothesis 1: The incidence of corporate failure is negatively related to the proportion of 
independent directors. 
2.2 Grey directors and corporate failure 
The theoretical support for the effectiveness of grey directors is rooted in the collaborative board 
model (Westphal, 1999). According to this perspective, a board should be constituted to optimise 
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collaborative working relationships among its members, thus enabling information flow in the 
boardroom and reinforcing the board’s strategy formulation function (Adams & Ferreira, 2007; 
Almazan & Suarez, 2003). However, not all NEDs will be equally able to enhance board collaboration. 
As noted above, independent directors are typically strict monitors. Their presence is more likely to 
increase tension in the boardroom and reduce valuable advisory interactions among board members 
because managers typically dislike intense oversight (Adams & Ferreira, 2007). However, personal or 
economic ties between NEDs and the firm enable NEDs to establish greater mutual trust with 
management and create a better collaborative working relationship in the boardroom. The ties 
therefore allow grey directors greater potential to exert their influence on decision-making by 
providing advice and resources (Westphal, 1999). Adam (2009) provides evidence that directors with 
personal ties to management perceive their role on boards to be more advisory in nature and are more 
likely to be involved in decision-making. 
Additionally, NEDs need to rely on firm-specific information to provide appropriate support to 
management, and management prefers to work with well-informed NEDs (Harris & Raviv, 2008). 
However, because NEDs are not involved in day-to-day executive duties, it has been argued that it is 
costly for them to acquire private information on the firm and thus transfer their knowledge to the 
firm (Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2008). Based on the mutual trust noted above, grey directors are more 
likely to obtain internal information provided by top management on a timely basis and use this 
information to advise top management on strategic issues. Schmidt (2008) provides evidence that the 
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presence of social ties between directors and management is positively associated with takeover 
returns when advisory needs are high, suggesting that information exchange within the boardroom is 
more efficient when directors have close relationships with top management. Close ties with the firm 
therefore place grey directors in an advantageous position to perform their strategic function. 
Furthermore, a board’s ability to maintain various resources and interorganisational strategies 
depends to a large degree on affiliations with grey directors. Baysinger and Butler (1985) suggest that 
grey directors are generally appointed for functional reasons. Grey directors, such as former 
executives of the company, are valuable in mentoring and supporting incumbent management. A 
company’s financial and legal advisor could, by sitting on the board, provide specific expertise and 
experience to complement the executive team (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Provan, 1980). In addition, 
the inclusion of grey directors on the board is a means of managing a company’s environmental 
relationships and enable the company to integrate the resources necessary for its operation (Burt, 1983; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Lastly, grey directors generally have interests in the firm (Vicknair, et al., 1993). These interests 
provide grey directors with greater incentive than independent directors to devote their time, effort 
and resources to the company they serve (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). Westphal (1999) argues that 
grey directors are therefore more willing to offer advice and actively engage in the strategy-making 
process (1999). While independent directors may be better monitors, a grey director’s incentive to 
turn a distressed firm around may be more intense than that of independent directors because grey 
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directors face an increased risk to their personal or economic interests when a firm is in trouble. The 
presence of such interests may even motivate grey directors to monitor management, thereby 
safeguarding their interests in the company. 
However, as previously noted, affiliations between NEDs and the firm are viewed as a violation of 
board oversight from the agency perspective (Vicknair, et al., 1993). Researchers have argued that 
such ties may reduce grey directors’ incentives to act against management and thus place grey 
directors in a compromised position. According to this view, the monitoring function of a board may 
be constrained when there are more grey directors on the board, which may lead to unfavourable 
organisational outcomes. 
Recently, governance reformers have also recognised the potential contributions of 
non-independent NEDs and have argued that the overemphasis on monitoring and control may risk 
the advisory role of NEDs and thus obscure business prosperity (Hampel Report, 1998; The Higgs 
Report, 2003). Therefore, based on the collaborative board model, we expect that a higher proportion 
of grey directors on the board will reduce the likelihood of corporate failure. 
Hypothesis 2: The incidence of corporate failure is negatively related to the proportion of grey 
directors. 
3. Research design 
3.1 Sample and data 
The aim of this study is to discuss the relationship between board structure and firm failure by 
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examining board structure prior to a corporate failure event. The empirical tests are based on a sample 
of failed UK-incorporated, non-financial and non-mining companies.2 Failed companies are identified 
by investigating the fates of all quoted companies delisted from the Official List on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) between 1997 and 2010.3 Additionally, companies were included in the sample if 
they were transferred from the Official List to the AIM (Alternative Investment Market) List and 
subsequently delisted from the AIM List between 1997 and 2010 without filing any annual accounts 
during their AIM listing periods.4 A company is considered to be a failed company in this study if the 
reason for the cancellation of its listing was its entry into receivership, administration or liquidation, 
consistent with the definition adopted by Peel and Peel (1988) and Neophytou and Molinero (2004). 
Based on the stated criteria, a population of 119 companies that failed between the years of 1997 
and 2010 was obtained. However, because complete data regarding corporate governance and 
financial information prior to failure were not available for all 119 failed companies, the final sample 
is composed of 117 failed companies.5 Table 1 presents the characteristics of the failed sample firms. 
Panel A presents the numbers of failures among the sample companies classified by the nature of the 
failure for each year from 1997 to 2010. Panel B presents the distribution of the industrial 
classifications of the 117 failed companies. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Furthermore, each failed company in the sample used in this analysis was matched with a live 
(non-failed) company. The matched pairs approach, “provides a parsimonious means of controlling 
for certain potentially important confounding (non-accounting) firm specific characteristics” of the 
targeted firms (Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2001:297). This approach provides a systematic method to 
determine the sample of non-failed companies and is used in the majority of studies in this area (e.g., 
Altman, 1968; Beaver, 1966; Charitou, Louca, & Vafeas, 2007; Daily & Dalton, 1994a, 1994b; 
Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1992; Keasey, McGuinness, & Short, 1990; Mangena & Chamisa, 2008).  
The matching process employed in this study is based on three criteria.6 First, failed and non-failed 
companies were matched in terms of the fiscal years of accounts used to extract corporate governance 
information and financial ratios. Second, the companies had to be matched in terms of the FTSE 
industrial sector such that the firms in each pair faced similar economic and industrial conditions 
(Chaganti, Mahajan, & Sharma, 1985).7 Third, non-failed companies were matched in terms of the 
failed company size (as measured by sales) determined from the last complete filed account prior to 
failure.8 
The corporate governance data used in this study were collected manually from the annual reports 
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of the failed and non-failed sample companies or the electronic resources ICC Plum, FAME or 
Lexis-Nexis. Financial information was obtained from the electronic resources Perfect Analysis or 
Datastream. 
On average, the failed companies were delisted only one month after the failure date. Additionally, 
the average length of time between the failure and the date of the last annual report (account issue 
date) was 14 months9 (10 months). Therefore, the failed companies’ corporate governance and 
financial information in the most recent annual reports and accounts prior to failure is used in the 
analysis; moreover, the information from the same fiscal year is used for the non-failed companies. 
However, if a failed company had been in material distress prior to its last set of filed accounts – 
indicators would include the absence of trading activities or suspension of trading on the LSE – the 
year in which the significant distress occurred is considered to be the actual failure year. In these 
circumstances, the annual report from the previous fiscal year is substituted to better reflect the 
economic reality. 
3.2 Regression model and specifications 
This study employs conditional logistic analysis to examine the hypotheses regarding the 
relationships between corporate governance characteristics and corporate failure. The general models 
are developed as follows: 
STATUS = β0 + β1 INED%i + β2 GNED%i + β3 INED_ED%i + β4 GNED_ED%i + β5 GNED_INED%i 
+ Β6 ED%i + β7 DUALITYi + β8 SINEDi + β9 CEOTENi + β10 BLOCKi + β11 ROAi + β12 LEVi 
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+ β13 LnSIZEi + β14 AGEi + ei 
Where, 
Survival Status (STATUS) = Dummy variable representing firm survival status, coded 
1 in the case of a failed firm or 0 in the case of a 
non-failed firm; 
Independent NED (INED%) = Percentage of the board members who are independent 
directors; 
Grey NED (GNED%) = Percentage of board members who are grey directors; 
Ratio of Independent to Executive 
Directors (INED_ED%) 
= Ratio of independent directors to executive directors, 
expressed as a percentage; 
Ratio of Grey to Executive Directors 
(GNED_ED%) 
= Ratio of grey directors to executive directors, expressed 
as a percentage; 
Ratio of Grey to Independent 
Directors (GNED_INED%) 
= Ratio of grey directors to independent directors, 
expressed as a percentage; 
Executive Director (ED%) = Percentage of the board members who are executive 
directors; 
CEO Duality (DUALITY) = Dummy variable representing leadership structure, coded 
1 if the positions of CEO and chairman are held by the 
same person or 0 otherwise; 
Senior Independent Director 
(SINED) 
= Dummy variable representing the presence of senior 
independent directors, coded 1 if there is a senior 
independent director on the board or 0 otherwise; 
CEO Tenure (CEOTEN) = Number of years that the incumbent CEO has been on the 
board; 
Block Shareholdings (BLOCK) = Total percentage of shareholdings held by external 
significant shareholders (i.e., shareholders holding more 
than 3% of total shares outstanding); 
Profitability (ROA) = Return on assets (proxy for firm performance: 
profitability); 
Leverage (LEV) = Ratio of total debts to total assets; 
Firm Size (LnSIZE) = Natural log of total assets (thousands); 
Firm Age (AGE) = The period between the incorporation date and failure 
date; 
β = parameters; 
ei = error term; and 
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i = the ith observation. 
 
We employ the independent/non-independent NED distinction stipulated in the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2012, Para. B.1.1) to classify independent and grey directors.10 Relying on this 
approach, a NED is coded as a grey director if he or she (a) has been an employee of the company or 
group within the past five years; (b) has or had a material business relationship with the company 
within the past three years; (c) has received additional remuneration such as performance-related 
payments or a pension from the company apart from a director’s fee; (d) has close family ties with the 
company’s other directors, advisors or senior employees; (e) holds cross-directorships; (f) represents a 
significant shareholder; or (g) has served on the board for more than nine years. 
The control variables are drawn from the previous literature. Six groups of control variables are 
applied in the analysis. First, the percentage of executive directors (ED%) is employed to control for 
management entrenchment and is expected to negatively affect firm survival (Daily & Dalton, 1994a). 
Second, the presence of CEO duality (DUALITY) is adopted to control for the independence of board 
leadership. It is suggested that the presence of CEO duality may lead to excessive power 
concentration in one person, diminishing the control (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and independence 
(Rechner, 1989) of the board. We therefore expect CEO duality to be positively related to the 
likelihood of corporate failure. Third, the presence of senior independent directors (SINED) is used as 
a control variable, as senior independent directors play an important role in monitoring the 
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effectiveness of the chairman, liaising with non-executive directors and communicating with major 
investors (The Higgs Report, 2003). The UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) therefore requires 
companies to nominate a senior independent director to their boards. It is expected that the presence 
of senior independent directors is negatively related to the likelihood of corporate failure.  
Fourth, CEO tenure (CEOTEN) is used to measure CEOs’ experience in the firm. As CEOs who 
have longer tenures in their firms are more likely to possess firm-specific knowledge, CEO tenure is 
expected to be negatively related to the likelihood of corporate failure (e.g., Hambrick & D'Aveni, 
1992; Simsek, 2007). Fifth, the concentration of external shareholdings (BLOCK) is also included as 
a control variable. It is argued that block shareholders have greater incentives and ability to become 
involved in monitoring activities. It is expected that firms with higher external block shareholdings 
are less likely to fail (e.g., Fama & Jensen, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Sixth, this study controls 
for ex ante failure risk by employing a profitability ratio (ROA), leverage ratio (LEV), firm size 
(LnSIZE) and firm age (AGE), which have been commonly used in previous bankruptcy research. It 
is expected that a firm with greater profitability, lower leverage, larger size and higher age is less 
likely to fail (e.g., Altman, 1968; Blum, 1974; Howton, 2006). 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics categorised by survival status for each of the independent 
variables and provides the results of the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank sum test for the continuous 
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variables and the Chi-squared test for categorical variables. The mean values of the percentage of 
independent directors (INED%) for the failed and non-failed firms are 30.48% and 27.94%, 
respectively, but this difference is insignificant. The finding does not support Hypothesis 1, which 
states that there is a negative association between the proportion of independent directors and the 
likelihood of corporate failure. However, the mean percentages of grey directors (GNED%) for the 
failed and non-failed firms are 15.72% and 21.50%, respectively, and this difference is statistically 
significant at the 5% level, suggesting that more grey directors are employed by the non-failed firms 
than by their failed counterparts. The finding thus supports Hypothesis 2, i.e., the proportion of grey 
directors on the board is negatively related to the likelihood of corporate failure. 
In addition, there is no significant difference in the ratios of independent directors to executive 
directors between the failed and non-failed firms (INED_ED%), while the ratios of grey directors to 
executive directors (GREY_ED%) are significantly higher in non-failed firms than that in failed firms. 
Compared to the failed firms, the non-failed firms have a significantly higher ratio of grey directors to 
independent directors (GREY_INED%). These results appear to indicate that increasing the 
representation of grey directors relative to both executive and independent directors on a board may 
reduce the likelihood of corporate failure. 
With regard to the control variables, the average proportions of executive directors (ED%) are 
53.80% and 50.55% for the failed and non-failed firms, respectively, and this difference is statistically 
significant at the 10% level. It appears that the boards of both the failed and non-failed firms are 
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generally dominated by executive directors. In addition, there is no significant difference in both the 
presence of leadership duality (DUALITY) and the presence of senior independent director (SINED) 
between the failed and non-failed firms. 
It is also found that the failed firms’ CEOs had significantly shorter tenures than their non-failed 
counterparts, in line with the suggestion by Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992). There is no significant 
difference in the external block shareholdings (BLOCK) between the failed and non-failed firms, 
which is not consistent with expectations. Additionally, compared to the failed firms, the non-failed 
firms have significantly higher profitability (ROA), lower leverage level (LEV) and greater asset size 
(LnSIZE). However, there is no significant difference in the firm ages (AGE) of the failed and 
non-failed firms. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The grey directors are further classified into seven areas based on the UK Corporate Governance 
Code (2012, Para. B.1.1). Table 3 shows the percentage of the grey directors in each grey area 
category on the board for both the failed and non-failed firms. It appears that in comparison to 
non-failed counterparts, the failed firms had a lower proportion of NEDs who had been employees of 
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the company (GNED1%), had a material business relationship with the company (GNED2%), 
received additional remuneration from the company apart from a director’s fee (GNED3%), had 
family ties with the management (GNED4%), held cross-directorships (GNED5%), represented 
significant shareholders (GNED6%), or had served on the board for more than nine years (GNED7%). 
The results suggest that, on average, the non-failed firms had consistently more grey directors across 
the seven categories than the failed firms. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
4.2 Results of the Conditional Logistic Regression Analysis 
Because multicollinearity is considered to be harmful in regression analysis, the Spearman rho 
correlations between the independent variables are provided in Table 4, and the variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) are computed and examined for each independent variable to examine whether 
multicollinearity is problematic. The correlations among all independent variables included in each 
regression analysis in this study are less than 0.40. Multicollinearity in regression analysis is only 
regarded as harmful when correlations exceed 0.7 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). In addition, in all of 
the cases shown in Table 5 and Table 6, the VIFs are below 2.0, far lower than the critical value of 10 
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(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), which also suggests that multicollinearity is not a major problem in the 
regression analyses. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 5 presents the results of the conditional logistic regression models used to examine the 
relationship between the likelihood of corporate failure and board composition one year prior to the 
corporate failure event. Model (1) examines the effect of independent directors on the likelihood of 
corporate failure and demonstrates that the likelihood of corporate failure is positively related to the 
proportion of independent directors (INED%) on boards (p < 0.05), which is not consistent with the 
agency perspective or Hypothesis 1. Model (2) examines the effect of grey directors on the likelihood 
of corporate failure and reveals a negative association between the likelihood of corporate failure and 
the proportion of grey directors (GNED%) on boards (p < 0.01), consistent with the collaborative 
board model suggested by Westphal (1999) and Hypothesis 2. The results of Model (1) and Model (2) 
reflect that, compared to the non-failed firms, independent (grey) directors may be overrepresented 
(underrepresented) on the boards of the failed firms. Model (3) examines the relationship between the 
proportion of executive directors or the aggregate proportion of NEDs11 and the likelihood of 
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corporate failure. The likelihood of corporate failure is not significantly associated with the proportion 
of executive directors on the board (ED%), which implies that the proportion of aggregate NEDs on 
the board is not significantly related to the likelihood of corporate failure. 
Model (4) in Table 5 further examines whether the weight of independent and grey directors 
relative to executive directors on a board is associated with the likelihood of corporate failure. No 
significant relationship is observed between the ratio of independent directors to executive directors 
(INED_ED%) and the likelihood of corporate failure, while the ratio of grey directors to executive 
directors (GNED_ED%) is negatively associated with the likelihood of corporate failure (p < 0.01). 
These findings may suggest that increasing the percentage of independent directors relative to 
executive directors on a board may not necessarily improve a firm’s viability, but increasing the 
weight of grey directors relative to executive directors on the boards of the failed firms might have 
enhanced their prospects of survival. 
Moreover, Model (5) in Table 5 examines the effect of the composition of NEDs on the likelihood 
of corporate failure. The result shows that the ratio of grey directors to independent directors on a 
board (GNED_INED%) is negatively related to the likelihood of corporate failure (p < 0.05), 
suggesting that increasing NEDs with grey directors may improve a firm’s viability. This result may 
reflect the failed firms’ over-reliance on independent directors, and these firms may have needed more 
grey directors than independent directors to continue to survive. 
With respect to the control variables, neither the presence of leadership duality (DUALITY) nor 
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the presence of senior independent directors (SIND) are significantly related to the likelihood of 
corporate failure. As noted above, a distressed firm requires a greater degree of the strategic and 
resource functions from its board (Filatotchev at al., 2006). Increased board monitoring by separating 
the roles of CEO and chairman and nominating a senior independent director may restrict 
management discretion to strategically respond to adverse situation in a troubled firm. Therefore, the 
results do not support to the importance of separating the roles of CEO and chairman and the presence 
of a senior independent director in maintaining a firm’s survival. 
In addition, CEO tenure (CEOTEN) and external shareholdings (BLOCK) are also not 
significantly related to corporate failure. Consistent with expectations, firms with higher profitability 
(ROA) and lower leverage (LEV) are less likely to fail. Little evidence shows that there is a negative 
relationship between firm size (LnSIZE) and corporate failure. However, the association between firm 
age (AGE) and the likelihood of corporate failure is not significant. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 1 further illustrates the margins of responses of the average probability of corporate failure 
for specific values of the percentages of independent directors (INED%) and grey directors (GNED%), 
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which analyses how the probability of corporate failure responds to changes in the percentages of 
independent directors and grey directors. The figure shows that the likelihood of corporate failure 
varies depending on changes in the percentages of independent directors (INED%) and grey directors 
(GNED%). The likelihood of corporate failure increases when the percentage of independent directors 
(INED%) increases, while the likelihood of corporate failure decreases when the percentage of grey 
directors (GNED%) decreases. In addition, those relationships appear to be non-linear and suggest 
that the marginal effects of independent (grey) directors on the probability of corporate failure 
increase (diminish) as their weight on the board increases. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Further tests are performed to examine the associations between the NEDs in each grey area and 
the incidence of corporate failure. Table 6 shows that the likelihood of corporate failure is 
significantly and negatively related to the percentage of non-executive directors who have been 
employees of the company (GNED1%) (Model (1)), have or had a material business relationship with 
the company (GNED2%) (Model (2)), have received additional remuneration from the company apart 
from a director’s fee (GNED3%) (Model (3)), have family ties with the management (GNED4%) 
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(Model (4)), represent significant shareholders (GNED6%) (Model (6)), and have served on the board 
for more than nine years (GNED7%) (Model (7)). The relationship between the percentage of NEDs 
who hold cross-directorships (GNED5%) and the incidence of corporate failure is also negative, but 
not significant (Model (5)). The results appear that different types of grey directors have a consistent 
effect on a firm’s survival, implying that a company may benefit from the presence of grey directors 
in maintaining viability regardless of their categories. 
Overall, the findings presented in Table 5 and Table 6 reveal the importance of grey directors on 
boards and support prior conceptual reasoning that grey directors can add value to a firm (Baysinger 
& Butler, 1985; Hampel Report, 1998; Westphal, 1999). Corporate governance reformers may 
understate (overstate) the potential benefits that grey directors (independent directors) provide to the 
firm. Because alternative NEDs perform different board functions in terms of strategy and control, the 
increased use of independent directors for board monitoring could lead to a reduced use of grey 
directors, reducing their positive impacts on firm performance. Consequently, an overemphasis on 
stacking NEDs with independent directors at the expense of grey directors is likely to be ineffective 
and make firms more susceptible to failure. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
4.3 Additional Analyses 
We perform additional analyses to determine the robustness of our results. First, certain studies and 
governance reports suggest that the absolute number of different types of directors on a board affects 
the weight of their views in the board’s decisions (e.g., Cadbury, 1992; Gales & Kesner, 1994; 
Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1992). We examine the associations between the likelihood of corporate failure 
and absolute numbers of independent directors and grey directors. We find that firms with a greater 
number of independent directors are more likely to fail and there is a negative relationship between 
the likelihood of corporate failure and the number of grey directors, consistent with our primary tests 
shown in models (1) and (2) in Table 5.  
Second, we employ an alternative definition suggested by Faleye et al. (2011) to classify 
independent and grey directors. A NED is considered to be an independent director if he/she serves on 
at least two of three major oversight committees (audit, remuneration and nomination committees); 
otherwise, he/she is considered to be a non-independent (grey) director. Faleye et al. (2011) argue that 
the dedication of a NED to monitoring activities reflects his/her function on the board. NEDs who 
concurrently serve on multiple oversight committees are more monitoring-intensive. They would 
devote significant time and efforts to oversight duties. However, NEDs who serve on a maximum of 
one oversight committee are more likely to contribute to the board in an advisory role because less 
intense monitoring can enable them to develop closer relationships and mutual trust with management, 
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allowing for them the time to focus more effectively on advising (Faleye et al., 2011). We find that 
firms with a greater proportion of NEDs who serve on at least two oversight committees are more 
likely to fail and there is a negative relationship between the likelihood of corporate failure and the 
proportion of NEDs serving on a maximum of one oversight committee. The findings are consistent 
with the primary results shown in Table 5, which reinforces the importance of non-independent (grey) 
directors to firm survival. 
Third, the UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) requires that at least half of the board should 
comprise independent directors, which implies that the UK governance reformers prefer that 
independent directors dominate corporate boards. We therefore investigate the effects of an 
overrepresentation of independent directors with respect to both grey directors and executive directors 
on the likelihood of corporate failure. The result shows that the overrepresentation of independent 
directors relative to grey directors is positively associated with the likelihood of corporate failure, but 
there is no significant relationship between the overrepresentation of independent directors relative to 
executive directors and the likelihood of corporate failure. These findings suggest that having a board 
dominated by independent directors may not necessarily improve the likelihood of firm survival, 
compared to having one with grey directors, in line with the findings presented in Table 5. 
Fourth, it is suggested that problematic firms may tend to change their board composition in 
response to poor performance (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). We thus employ the interaction term 
between the percentage of independent directors and return on assets and the interaction term between 
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the percentage of grey directors and return on assets to examine whether the effects of the percentages 
of independent and grey directors on the likelihood of corporate failure are subject to firm 
performance. However, we find that the interactions between firm performance and the percentages of 
independent directors and grey directors are not significantly related to the likelihood of corporate 
failure. 
Lastly, the previous literature has suggested interrelationships or trade-offs between various 
governance mechanisms. Charitou et al. (2007) argue that external block shareholders are effective 
monitors because they have significant interests in the firms. A firm may demand fewer independent 
directors when its external block shareholders have higher ownership shares in the firm, suggesting 
that the effect of independent directors on firm performance is subject to the degree of external block 
shareholdings (Charitou, et al., 2007; Mak & Li, 2001). This study therefore also analyses the 
relationship between the likelihood of corporate failure and the interactions between the percentages 
of independent directors and external block shareholdings. However, the result shows that the 
interactive effect of the percentage of independent directors and external block shareholdings is not 
significantly related to the likelihood of corporate failure. 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
In this study, we examine whether a firm’s board structure is related to the likelihood of corporate 
failure in the UK. Particularly, we address the effectiveness of different types of NEDs: independent 
directors and grey directors. In doing so, we compare the board compositions of 117 failed firms to 
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those of a set of year-, industry- and size-matched non-failed firms. The empirical results suggest that 
firms with greater proportions of grey directors on their boards are less likely to fail. This result is 
confirmed when we separately analyse the seven categories of grey directors defined by the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2012, Para. B.1.1). However, there is a significant, positive relationship 
between independent directors and corporate failure. Furthermore, the findings also demonstrate that 
firms with a greater share of grey directors relative both to executive and independent directors on 
their boards are less likely to fail. 
The findings of this study appear to have important implications for the corporate governance 
literature. The findings demonstrate the importance of grey directors, consistent with the collaborative 
board model suggested by Westphal (1999) and Adams and Ferreira (2007) and the conceptual 
arguments of Baysinger and Butler (1985) and Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990). This result suggests 
that personally and economically tied NEDs who serve on boards can add value to firms. The results 
also contribute to the critique that the effectiveness of independent directors may be overstated in 
governance reform efforts (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Coles, 
Daniel, & Naveen, 2008; Faleye, et al., 2011; Hwang & Kim, 2009; Mace, 1986; Patton & Baker, 
1987). An overemphasis on monitoring and control by independent directors may come at the expense 
of the contributions that NEDs can make to wealth creation (Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Faleye, et al., 
2011; The Higgs Report, 2003). 
Although the results of this study are important, they must be interpreted in light of the following 
 32 
 
limitations, which may be addressed in future research. First, this study focuses on the observable 
personal or economic ties defined by the UK Corporate Governance Code (2012). This may 
underestimate the effects of unobservable friendship ties between executive directors and NEDs. 
Second, all of the sample companies considered in this study were classified in terms of the UK 
bankruptcy code. In fact, corporate failure could be a consequence of various reasons such as liquidity 
problem, ethical problem of management and changes in the external environment. A greater 
understanding of the relationship between corporate governance and corporate failure could be gained 
by extending the investigation to include the effectiveness of different corporate governance 
mechanisms in mitigating those various causes of failure that are beyond the scope of this study. 
Extending the current study into different settings in terms of various reasons of corporate failure 
might be a useful direction for future research. 
  
 33 
 
Notes 
1 In this study we refer to ‘personal or economic ties (affiliations) between NEDs and the firm’ and 
intend it to include NEDs’ affiliations with both the firm and its management. 
2 Companies in financial and mining sectors were excluded on the grounds that they have a number of 
significant differences in terms of industrial characteristics and accounting systems, such as 
income-measuring accounting rules. 
3 The lists of companies revoked from the Official List on The London Stock Exchange are obtained 
from the electronic resources Citytext and Hemscott Company Guru. 
4 There are 14 companies in our final sample that were transferred from the Official List to the AIM 
List between 1997 and 2010. Those AIM companies are considered officially listed companies in this 
study because they went into receivership, administration or liquidation immediately after moving 
onto the AIM list, and all of their filed information is obtained during their official listing periods. 
5 Similar to existing US-based governance-failure studies, there are relatively few large-scale 
companies subject to failure in the UK. There were only 21, 57, 57 and 50 failed companies in the 
studies by Chaganti et al. (1985), Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992), Daily and Dalton (1994a, 1994b), 
respectively. 
6 The time period, industry classification and company size matching criteria employed in this study 
have commonly been used in prior bankruptcy studies (e.g., Blum, 1974; Beaver, 1966; Daily, 1996). 
7 Each failed sample company was matched with a non-failed company at the 3-digit level of the 
sub-sector code of the FTSE industrial classification. 
8 Within the industry group of each failed sample firm, the non-failed firm that had total sales most 
similar to the total sales of the failed firms was selected as the matching non-failed sample firm. 
9 This result is similar to the findings of Citron and Taffler (1992) and Lennox (1999). 
10 We classify all non-executive directors who do not meet the independence criteria defined by the 
UK Corporate Governance Code (2012, Para. B.1.1) as non-independent (grey) directors in this study, 
although the Code allows for the board to state its reasons if it considers a director independent 
notwithstanding he or she failing to meet the criteria. 
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11 NEDs include both independent directors and grey directors. The total percentage of NEDs on the 
board is equal to 100% minus the percentage of executive directors on the board (ED%). 
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Table 1  
The Characteristics of Failed Sample Firms 
Panel A: Number of failed sample companies and nature of the failure 
   Nature of Failure  Frequency  Percentage 
Delisting 
 
 Liquidation  Receivership  Administration   
1997  0  1  1  2  2% 
1998  1  4  3  8  7% 
1999  3  4  3  10  9% 
2000  6  4  1  11  9% 
2001  2  6  6  14  12% 
2002  13  7  5  25  21% 
2003  2  7  2  11  9% 
2004  3  3  1  7  6% 
2005  1  2  3  6  5% 
2006  1  2  0  3  3% 
2007  0  0  0  0  0% 
2008  0  1  5  6  5% 
2009  0  0  9  9  8% 
2010  1  0  4  5  4% 
Total  33  41  43  117  100% 
Panel B: Distribution of the FTSE industrial classifications of the failed sample companies 
Industrial Classifications 
 
Frequency 
 
% 
Basic Materials  4  3% 
Industrials  32  27% 
Consumer Goods  24  21% 
Health Care  6  5% 
Consumer Services  28  24% 
Telecommunications  6  5% 
Utilities  2  2% 
Technology  15  13% 
Total  117  100% 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of the Sample and Univariate Analysis 
Variables 
 Failed firms  Non-failed Firms            
 Mean Median Min Max   Std dev  Mean Median Min Max   
Std 
dev  
t Test / 
Chi-squared 
Test(3) 
 Wilcoxon Test  
INED%  30.48  33.33  0.00  80.00   17.87   27.94  25.00  0.00  75.00   18.53   1.07    0.71   
GNED%  15.72  12.50  0.00  66.67   18.71   21.50  20.00  0.00  75.00   17.39   2.45  **  2.47  ** 
INED_ED%  64.58 60.00 0.00 400.00  55.07  69.85 50.00 0.00 400.00  64.79  0.71   1.06  
GNED_ED%  34.80 20.00 0.00 300.00  49.63  56.75 40.00 0.00 600.00  83.20  2.42 **  2.57 ** 
GNED_INED%  49.61 0.00 0.00 300.00  73.25  98.39 50.00 0.00 600.00  123.41  2.92 ***  2.69 *** 
ED%  53.80  50.00  0.00  100.00   15.04   50.55  50.00  12.50  100.00   16.36   1.75  *  1.88  * 
DUALITY  0.23 0.00 0.00 1.00  0.42  0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00  0.38  1.30     
SINED  0.55 1.00 0.00 1.00  0.50  0.60 1.00 0.00 1.00  0.49  0.63     
CEOTEN  5.85  5.00  0.00  29.00   4.81   8.52  7.00  0.00  36.00   5.64   3.54  ***  3.78  *** 
BLOCK  37.81  38.22  0.00  87.62   19.27   38.33  33.81  3.14  76.91   18.45   0.23      2.54  
ROA  -0.23  -0.10  -5.20  0.43   0.60   0.04  0.09  -0.88  0.52   0.21   4.87  ***  6.56  *** 
LEV  0.34  0.31  0.00  2.79   0.26   0.17  0.14  0.00  1.14   0.18   4.91  ***  5.75  *** 
LnSIZE  10.72 10.57 7.10 14.09  1.37  11.08 10.96 7.08 18.96  1.60  2.24 **  2.21 ** 
AGE  36.92 20.00 1.00 132.00  34.23  40.01 30.00 4.00 115.00  32.10  0.75   1.02  
Notes: (1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at the p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.1 levels, respectively, based on 
two-tailed tests. (2) INED%: the percentage of total board members who are independent directors; GNED%: 
the percentage of total board members who are grey directors; INED_ED%: the ratio of independent directors to 
executive directors; GNED_ED%: the ratio of grey directors to executive directors; GNED_INED%: the ratio of 
grey directors to independent directors; ED%: the percentage of board members who are executive directors; 
DUALITY: the presence of leadership duality; SINED: the presence of a senior independent director; CEOTEN: 
number of years that the incumbent CEO has spent on the board; BLOCK: total percentage of shareholdings 
held by significant external shareholders; ROA: return on assets; LEV: the percentage of total debts in terms of 
total assets; LnSIZE: natural log of total assets (£000); AGE: firm age. (3) T-tests and Wilcoxon rank sum tests 
for continuous variables and Chi-squared test for categorical variables (DUALITY and SINED). 
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Table 3 
Percentage of directors in each grey area category 
Grey directors Categories1   Failed Firms  Non-failed Firms   
GNED1% Former Employee of Company or Group  4.03% (25.64%)  5.97% (27.77%)  
GNED2% Material Business Relationship with Company  1.68% (10.69%)  5.63% (26.19%)  
GNED3% Receives additional remuneration from the company apart from a director's fee  3.68% (23.41%)  6.29% (29.26%)  
GNED4% Relatives of Management  0.21% (1.34%)  0.95% (4.42%)  
GNED5% Cross Directorships  3.33% (21.18%)  3.39% (15.77%)  
GNED6% Represents a significant shareholder  7.39% (47.01%)  9.60% (44.65%)  
GNED7% Serving on the board for more than nine years   5.10% (32.44%)  10.19% (47.40%)   
Notes: (1) The table presents the percentage of grey directors in each grey area category relative to the total 
number of directors. The percentage of grey directors in each grey area category relative to the total number of 
grey directors is shown in parentheses. (2) The grey directors are classified in terms of the categories 
recommended by the UK Corporate Governance Code (2012, Para. B.1.1). (3) GNED1%: the percentage of grey 
directors who have been an employee of the company or group; GNED2%: the percentage of grey directors who 
have or had a material business relationship with the company; GNED3%: the percentage of grey directors who 
have received additional remuneration apart from a director’s fee; GNED4%: the percentage of grey directors 
who have close family ties with the company’s other directors, advisors or senior employees; GNED5%: the 
percentage of grey directors who hold cross-directorships; GNED6%: the percentage of grey directors who 
represent significant shareholders; GNED7%: the percentage of grey directors who have served on the board for 
more than nine years. (4) Percentages sum to more than 15.72% and 21.50% of total directors of the failed and 
non-failed firms, respectively, because certain grey directors fit multiple categories. 
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Table 4 
Spearman’s rho Correlations among Independent Variables 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13 
                           
1 INED% 1.00                          
2 GNED% -0.62  *** 1.00                        
3 INED_ED% 0.88  *** -0.24  *** 1.00                      
4 GNED_ED% -0.53  *** 0.99  *** -0.13  * 1.00                    
5 GNED_INED% -0.73  *** 0.97  *** -0.39  *** 0.93  *** 1.00                  
6 ED% -0.33  *** -0.47  *** -0.69  *** -0.54  *** -0.32  *** 1.00                
7 DUALITY -0.02   -0.19  *** -0.09   -0.21  *** -0.16  ** 0.24  *** 1.00              
8 SINED 0.19  *** 0.04   0.23  *** 0.07   -0.01   -0.23  *** 0.10   1.00            
9 CEOTEN -0.09   -0.04   -0.15  ** -0.07   -0.01   0.14  ** 0.22  ** 0.05   1.00          
10 BLOCK 0.13  * 0.07   0.25  *** 0.08   0.02   -0.25  *** -0.06   -0.05   0.02   1.00        
11 ROA -0.11   0.03   -0.13  * 0.02   0.06   0.09   0.01   -0.06   0.25  *** 0.04   1.00      
12 LEV 0.05   -0.14  * 0.01   -0.13  * -0.14  ** 0.14  * 0.11   -0.14  * -0.17  ** -0.05   -0.17  ** 1.00    
13 LnSIZE 0.15  ** -0.01   0.19  *** 0.03   -0.05   -0.11   0.05   0.25  *** 0.12  * -0.03   0.26  *** 0.13  * 1.00  
14 AGE 0.05   0.04   0.06   0.05   0.01   -0.06   0.11   -0.07   0.13  * 0.11   0.01   0.04   0.06  
 
Notes: (1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at the p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.1 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. (2) INED%: the percentage of board 
members who are independent directors; GNED%: the percentage of board members who are grey directors; INED_ED%: the ratio of independent directors to executive 
directors; GNED_ED%: the ratio of grey directors to executive directors; GNED_INED%: the ratio of grey directors to independent directors; ED%: the percentage of board 
members who are executive directors; DUALITY: the presence of leadership duality; SINED: the presence of a senior independent director; CEOTEN: number of years that 
the incumbent CEO has spent on the board; BLOCK: total percentage of shareholdings held by significant external shareholders; ROA: return on assets; LEV: percentage of 
total debts in terms of total assets; LnSIZE: natural log of total assets (thousands); AGE: firm age. 
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Table 5 
Conditional Logistic Regression of the Association between Board Composition and the Incidence of 
Corporate Failure 
Dependent Variable: 1: Failed Firms, 0: Non-failed Firms 
Variables  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  
            
INED%  0.033**          
  (0.013)          
GNED%    -0.040***        
    (0.013)        
INED_ED%        0.003    
        (0.004)    
GNED_ED%        -0.009***    
        (0.003)    
GNED_INED%          -0.007**  
          (0.003)  
ED%      0.017    0.018  
      (0.014)    (0.018)  
DUALITY  0.501  0.060  0.006  0.225  0.622  
  (0.620)  (0.656)  (0.610)  (0.671)  (0.803)  
SINED  -0.258  -0.239  0.244  -0.379  -0.314  
  (0.581)  (0.541)  (0.490)  (0.550)  (0.809)  
CEOTEN  -0.051  -0.058  -0.046  -0.041  -0.054  
  (0.048)  (0.051)  (0.053)  (0.050)  (0.060)  
BLOCK  -0.012  -0.002  0.001  -0.004  -0.006  
  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.015)  
ROA  -3.894**  -4.116**  -3.910**  -3.903**  -3.659*  
  (1.938)  (1.736)  (1.710)  (1.838)  (2.139)  
LEV  4.427*  4.537**  3.995**  4.490**  4.294**  
  (2.373)  (1.978)  (1.926)  (2.286)  (1.749)  
LnSIZE  -0.439*  -0.342*  -0.202  -0.254  -0.262  
  (0.204)  (0.185)  (0.180)  (0.246)  (0.268)  
AGE  0.008  0.007  0.003  0.006  -0.000  
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  
            
Observations  234  234  234  226  172  
Log likelihood  -42.97  -40.78  -46.12  -40.79  -29.33  
Chi-square  27.64***  31.80***  29.90***  34.15***  29.26***  
Pseudo R2  0.470  0.497  0.431  0.479  0.508  
Notes: (1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at the p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.1 levels, respectively, based on 
two-tailed tests; robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. (2) INED%: the percentage of board 
members who are independent directors; GNED%: the percentage of board members who are grey directors; 
INED_ED%: the ratio of independent directors to executive directors; GNED_ED%: the ratio of grey directors 
to executive directors; GNED_INED%: the ratio of grey directors to independent directors; ED%: the 
percentage of board members who are executive directors; DUALITY: the presence of leadership duality; 
SINED: the presence of a senior independent director; CEOTEN: number of years that the incumbent CEO has 
spent on the board; BLOCK: total percentage of shareholdings held by significant external shareholders; ROA: 
return on assets; LEV: percentage of total debts in terms of total assets; LnSIZE: natural log of total assets 
(thousands); AGE: firm age. (3) The table shows the results for one year prior to failure. The results are largely 
unchanged in the second, third and fourth years prior to failure. 
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Table 6 
Conditional Logistic Regression of the Association between Different Category of Grey Directors and the 
Incidence of Corporate Failure 
Dependent Variable: 1: Failed Firms, 0: Non-failed Firms 
Variables  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6)  Model (7)  
                
                
GNED1%  -0.041**              
  (0.018)              
GNED2%    -0.074***            
    (0.021)            
GNED3%      -0.056***          
      (0.020)          
GNED4%        -0.112*        
        (0.059)        
GNED5%          -0.013      
          (0.015)      
GNED6%            -0.025*    
            (0.015)    
GNED7%              -0.044**  
              (0.018)  
DUALITY  0.126  0.375  -0.019  0.151  0.211  0.082  -0.125  
  (0.619)  (0.744)  (0.626)  (0.609)  (0.609)  (0.647)  (0.565)  
SINED  0.075  -0.034  0.044  0.098  0.164  -0.113  0.046  
  (0.495)  (0.546)  (0.532)  (0.454)  (0.488)  (0.524)  (0.557)  
CEOTEN  -0.043  -0.046  -0.033  -0.043  -0.047  -0.047  -0.035  
  (0.050)  (0.057)  (0.051)  (0.054)  (0.054)  (0.053)  (0.043)  
BLOCK  -0.003  -0.000  -0.002  -0.006  -0.003  -0.001  -0.003  
  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.013)  
ROA  -3.803**  -4.253**  -4.370**  -3.747**  -3.921**  -3.915**  -3.612***  
  (1.699)  (1.969)  (1.794)  (1.821)  (1.733)  (1.758)  (1.402)  
LEV  4.246**  3.709*  4.215*  4.380*  4.155*  4.138*  3.914***  
  (1.955)  (2.227)  (2.004)  (2.282)  (2.127)  (2.128)  (1.469)  
LnSIZE  -0.291  -0.162  -0.279  -0.260  -0.270  -0.254  -0.315  
  (0.177)  (0.187)  (0.182)  (0.186)  (0.182)  (0.178)  (0.165)  
AGE  0.004  0.004  0.006  0.002  0.005  0.004  0.003  
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  
                
Observations  234  234  234  234  234  234  234  
Log likelihood  -45.10  -42.27  -42.65  -45.26  -45.74  -45.03  -43.35  
Chi-square  29.98***  28.55***  31.97***  25.16***  27.67***  28.47***  48.90***  
Pseudo R2  0.444  0.479  0.474  0.442  0.429  0.445  0.465  
Notes: (1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at the p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.1 levels, respectively, based on 
two-tailed tests; robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. (2) GNED1%: the percentage of grey 
directors who have been an employee of the company or group; GNED2%: the percentage of grey directors who 
have or had a material business relationship with the company; GNED3%: the percentage of grey directors who 
have received additional remuneration apart from a director’s fee; GNED4%: the percentage of grey directors 
who have close family ties with the company’s other directors, advisors or senior employees; GNED5%: the 
percentage of grey directors who hold cross-directorships; GNED6%: the percentage of grey directors who 
represent significant shareholders; GNED7%: the percentage of grey directors who have served on the board for 
more than nine years. (3) The definitions for the control variables have been presented in Table 5. 
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Figure 1.  
The relationships between board composition and the probability of corporate failure 
 
Notes: (1) This figure depicts the margins of responses of the average probability of corporate failure for 
specific values of INED% and GNED%. We use the predictions of models (1) and (2) in Table 5 to calculate the 
probability of failure for each observation at fixed values of INED% and GNED%, respectively, and the 
observed values of the remaining covariates. We then calculate the average probability of failure by averaging 
the probability of failure of each observation. (2) INED%: the percentage of board members who are 
independent directors; GNED%: the percentage of board members who are grey directors. 
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